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Abstract
In studies of discrimination, researchers often seek to estimate a causal effect of race or
gender on outcomes. For example, in the criminal justice context, one might ask whether
arrested individuals would have been subsequently charged or convicted had they been a different
race. It has long been known that such counterfactual questions face measurement challenges
related to omitted-variable bias, and conceptual challenges related to the definition of causal
estimands for largely immutable characteristics. Another concern, raised most recently in Knox
et al. [2020], is post-treatment bias. The authors argue that many studies of discrimination
condition on intermediate outcomes, like being arrested, which themselves may be the product
of discrimination, corrupting statistical estimates. Here we show that the Knox et al. critique is
itself flawed, suffering from a mathematical error. Within their causal framework, we prove that
a primary quantity of interest in discrimination studies is nonparametrically identifiable under a
standard ignorability condition that is common in causal inference with observational data. More
generally, though, we argue that it is often problematic to conceptualize discrimination in terms
of a causal effect of protected attributes on decisions. We present an alternative perspective that
avoids the common statistical difficulties, and which closely relates to long-standing legal and
economic theories of disparate impact. We illustrate these ideas both with synthetic data and by
analyzing the charging decisions of a prosecutor’s office in a large city in the United States.
∗We thank Alex Chohlas-Wood, Avi Feller, Andrew Gelman, Zhiyuan “Jerry” Lin, Steven Raphael, and Amy
Shoemaker for helpful conversations.
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1 Introduction
To assess the role of race or gender in decision making, researchers often examine disparities between
groups after adjusting for relevant factors. For example, to measure racial discrimination in lending
decisions, one might estimate race-specific approval rates after adjusting for creditworthiness, typically
via a regression model. This simple statistical strategy—sometimes called benchmark analysis—has
been used to study discrimination in a wide variety of domains, including banking [Munnell et al.,
1996], employment [Berg and Lien, 2002], education [Baum and Goodstein, 2005], healthcare [Balsa
et al., 2005], housing [Greenberg et al., 2016], and criminal justice [Fryer Jr, 2019, MacDonald and
Raphael, 2017, Rehavi and Starr, 2014].1
The results of benchmark analyses are often framed in causal terms (e.g., as an effect of race on
outcomes), but it is well understood that such an approach suffers from at least three significant
statistical challenges when used to estimate causal quantities. First, at a conceptual level, it is
unclear how best to rigorously define causal estimands of interest when the treatment is race, gender,
or another largely immutable trait. Second, estimates can be plagued by omitted-variable bias if one
does not appropriately adjust for all relevant covariates. Third—and the focus of our paper—there
are concerns that estimates are corrupted by post-treatment bias when one adjusts for covariates
or restricts to samples of individuals determined downstream from the treatment variable. In the
context of policing, Knox et al. [2020, p. 2] argue that post-treatment bias, particularly arising
from sample selection, is so pervasive and pernicious that “existing empirical work in this area is
producing a misleading portrait of evidence as to the severity of racial bias in police behavior.”
To better understand these three challenges, consider the problem of measuring racial discrimi-
nation in prosecutorial charging decisions. After an individual has been arrested, prosecutors in the
district attorney’s office read the arresting officer’s incident report and then decide whether or not to
press charges. For simplicity, we assume prosecutors only have access to the incident report—and to
no other information—when making their decisions. We allow, however, for the possibility that the
arrest decision that preceded the charging decision may have suffered from racial discrimination in
complex ways that cannot be inferred from the incident reports themselves. Finally, we assume that
the researcher has access to these incident reports but, importantly, not to any data on individuals
that officers considered but ultimately decided against arresting.
The first challenge is to rigorously define the causal estimand of interest. The inherent difficulty
is captured by the statistical refrain “no causation without manipulation” [Holland, 1986], since it is
often unclear what it means to alter attributes like race and gender, as well as how such an intervention
might actually be performed [Sekhon, 2008]. One common maneuver is to instead consider the causal
effect of perceived attributes (e.g., perceived race or perceived gender), which ostensibly can be
manipulated—for example, by changing the name listed on an employment application [Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004], or by masking an individual’s appearance [Goldin and Rouse, 2000, Grogger
and Ridgeway, 2006, Pierson et al., 2020]. In our case, one might imagine a hypothetical experiment
in which explicit mentions of race in the incident report are altered (e.g., replacing “white” with
“Black”). The causal effect is then, by definition, the difference in charging rates between those cases
in which arrested individuals were randomly described (and hence may be perceived) as “Black” and
1One popular alternative to benchmark analysis is outcome analysis, in which one looks at the success rates of
decisions rather than the decision rates themselves [Becker, 1957, 1993]. For example, in the lending context, one
can look at race-specific default rates of applicants who ultimately received loans. If minority borrowers are found
to default at lower rates than white borrowers, that suggests that lenders may discriminate by having a higher bar
for minorities. Outcome tests can mitigate concerns about omitted-variable bias, but raise new concerns related to
the problem of infra-marginality [Ayres, 2002, Simoiu et al., 2017]. For simplicity, we limit our primary discussion to
benchmark analysis, though we note that our substantive conclusions largely extend to outcome tests as well.
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those in which they were randomly described as “white.” This conceptualization of discrimination is
imperfect—partly due to implicit indications of race, as we discuss below—but it conforms to one
common causal understanding of discrimination used, for example, in audit studies. This framing
also maps closely to the legal notion of disparate treatment, an unlawful form of discrimination in
which actions are motivated by animus or otherwise discriminatory intent [Goel et al., 2017].
In the absence of such an experiment, one can in theory identify this type of causal estimand
from purely observational data by comparing charging rates across pairs of cases that are identical
in all aspects other than the stated race of the arrested individual. That strategy, which mimics
the key features of the randomized experiment described above, is formally justified by assuming
treatment assignment (i.e., description of race on the incident report, and subsequent perception by
the prosecutor) is ignorable given the observed covariates (i.e., features of the incident report) [Imbens
and Rubin, 2015]. In practice, though, this approach may suffer from omitted-variable bias when the
full incident report is not available to researchers, and may suffer from lack of overlap when suitable
matches cannot be found for each case—limitations common to nearly all observational studies of
causal effects. To address these issues, one can restrict attention to the overlap region and gauge the
robustness of estimates to varying forms and degrees of unmeasured confounding [Cornfield et al.,
1959, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b], a classic statistical tack that remains underutilized in many
applied settings [Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020].
Finally, there is the issue of post-treatment bias, especially due to sample selection. Knox
et al. argue that researchers inadvertently introduce post-treatment bias in observational studies of
discrimination by conditioning on intermediate outcomes, such as—in our charging example—being
arrested, which themselves may be the product of discrimination. As a result, the authors assert
that causal quantities of interest cannot be identified by the data in the absence of implausible
assumptions, such as lack of discrimination in the initial arrest decision. In making their argument,
Knox et al. focus on the use of force by police officers in civilian encounters, but their mathematical
framework applies more broadly; in particular, Knox et al.’s statistical claims—if true—would imply
that one could not hope to measure discrimination in prosecutorial decisions using observational
data.2
We re-examine these claims and show that the Knox et al. critique is flawed. The mathematical
framework we adopt mirrors theirs, and, in particular, we consider identical causal estimands. Under
their causal framework, we prove that one of the primary quantities of interest in discrimination studies
is in fact nonparametrically identified under a standard ignorability condition. More specifically,
we demonstrate that one can estimate discrimination in charging decisions in a principled manner,
even when arrest decisions are discriminatory in unknown ways. We trace our qualitatively different
conclusion to a logical error in the Knox et al. analysis: the authors conflate sufficiency with necessity.
Knox et al. derive a complex set of conditions—including no discrimination in earlier stages of
the decision making process—that collectively are sufficient to guarantee identifiability, but then
mistakenly conclude that those conditions are also necessary. In fact, the standard ignorability
assumption is also sufficient.
At a conceptual level, the authors fail to account for the precise timing of events. Indeed, in our
charging example, there are effectively two treatments, one affecting an officer’s arrest decision and
the other affecting a prosecutor’s charging decision. The arrest decision is post-treatment relative
to the officer’s perception of race but, importantly, it is pre-treatment relative to the prosecutor’s
perception of race. Similarly, the features of the incident report—which we must adjust for in
this type of benchmark analysis—are post-treatment relative to the officer’s perception of race
2The authors state that their “results can inform the study of racial discrimination in a host of other settings
beyond law enforcement . . . Our identifying assumptions may also be useful for researchers seeking to address biases
stemming from posttreatment conditioning more generally, beyond studies of discrimination” [p. 16].
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but pre-treatment relative to the prosecutor’s perception of race. In such a two-decider situation,
as Greiner and Rubin [2011] suggest, one can recover estimates of discrimination by the second
decider (e.g., in the charging decision) under the standard ignorability assumption, even if there is
discrimination by the first decider (e.g., in the arrest decision).3 The motivating example of Knox
et al. involves a single decider making two decisions—an officer first deciding whether to make a stop
and then deciding whether to use force—but their formal mathematical statements apply equally to
both the one-decider and the two-decider settings.
We illustrate these ideas by analyzing synthetic data, as well as by analyzing a detailed dataset
of actual charging decisions for approximately 20,000 felony arrests in a major U.S. city. On the
synthetic data, we construct simple examples that satisfy standard ignorability but which violate the
Knox et al. conditions, and then show that traditional benchmark analysis recovers the true causal
effect. On the real-world data, we show that Black and white individuals with similar observable
characteristics were charged at comparable rates, but that men were charged about 2.5% more
often than otherwise similar women. Under an ignorability assumption, one could interpret this gap
causally and say that prosecutors charged men more often than similarly situated women because of
their gender. A standard sensitivity analysis [Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020] shows that this result is
robust to moderate violations of the ignorability assumption.
To engage with past work, we prove our mathematical results and conduct our primary empirical
analysis within a common causal framework of discrimination, where one measures the effects of
protected traits, like race and gender, on decisions. More generally, though, we argue that this
narrow focus on such disparate treatment fails to capture disparate impact, an alternative form of
discrimination central to many legal judgments and policy prescriptions. In spirit, disparate impact
enquiries flip the usual causal question of disparate treatment studies: instead of measuring the effect
of race on decisions, one measures the effect of decisions on racial disparities. Suppose, hypothetically,
that prosecutors adopted a policy of charging wealthy individuals less often than poorer ones who
had otherwise similar cases, and that this policy led to racial disparities in charging rates. Under
a traditional disparate treatment framework—in which racial disparities would be estimated after
adjusting for income and other factors that are pre-treatment relative to the prosecutor’s perception
of race—one would conclude there was no discrimination in prosecutorial decisions. However, that
analysis would overlook the policy’s unjustified disparate impact [Ayres, 2005, Jung et al., 2018].
The criminal justice system involves a large number of actors making an even larger number of
decisions, ranging from an officer’s decision to patrol a certain block to a judge’s decision to impose
a certain sentence. As such, we share Knox et al.’s concerns with viewing discrimination narrowly
through the lens of a single decision point. Even if—hypothetically—officers did not discriminate
in post-stop use of force, communities of color would still likely be subject to disproportionate
police violence stemming from discrimination in initial stop decisions, as has been found in previous
research (cf. Goel et al. [2016], Pierson et al. [2020]). Nevertheless, careful examination of specific
decision points can often help one target interventions and inform policy reforms. Further, regard-
less of purpose, the application of faulty mathematical and theoretical reasoning jeopardizes the
entire enterprise of quantitative discrimination studies. By clarifying the statistical foundations of
discrimination analysis, we hope our contributions help to advance this important area of work.
3Greiner and Rubin [2011, p. 779] write: “In complicated transactions . . . a researcher may have more than one
choice of decider to study. . . . By focusing on a decider who perceives the unit’s immutable characteristic ‘late’ in the
interaction, the researcher implicitly chooses a later timing of treatment assignment, rendering more measured variables
pretreatment and thus properly characterized as covariates. That in turn can make an ignorability assumption more
plausible. But by treating such variables as covariates (and thus conditioning on them in the analysis), the researcher
forgoes the detection of any prior discrimination that may have affected the values of these covariates.”
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2 Defining and Estimating a Measure of Discrimination
To formally state our results, we first introduce a simple two-step model of discrimination and
define the main causal quantity of interest within this general framework. The initial setup mirrors
that of Knox et al., though we more explicitly account for the precise timing of events. We then
state an ignorability condition and prove that it is sufficient to guarantee that the controlled direct
effect among the observed (cdeOb), the primary measure of discrimination we consider here, is
nonparametrically identified, in contrast to the claims of Knox et al. Finally, we compare the
cdeOb to the total effect (te), a second causal estimand considered by Knox et al., and show that
although these estimands appear formally distinct, in many scenarios they are two sides of the
same coin. Indeed, this correspondence illustrates that post-treatment bias is an elusive concept in
observational studies of discrimination. Our notation differs slightly from that of Knox et al., but
our key mathematical definitions are identical to theirs.
2.1 A Model of Discrimination
We start by describing a two-step model to characterize discriminatory decision making in a variety
of real-world situations. In the first stage, each individual in some population is subject to a binary
decision, such as an offer of employment, admission to college, or law enforcement action. The
main illustrative example we consider in this paper concerns arrest decisions in the U.S. criminal
justice system, where a police officer may decide to arrest an individual if sufficient evidence exists
to suggest participation in criminal activity. Those who receive a “positive” first-stage decision (e.g.,
those who are arrested) proceed to a second stage, where another binary decision is made. In our
running example, the case of each arrested individual is reviewed in the second stage by a prosecutor
who may or may not choose to press charges. Importantly, those who are not arrested do not have
a case that requires review by a prosecutor and, indeed, there may be no administrative record of
those individuals. The central aim of this paper is to clarify the technical assumptions needed to
statistically identify discrimination—more precisely, disparate treatment—in the second stage (e.g.,
the charging decision) when data are only available for those who made it past the first stage (e.g.,
those who were arrested), particularly when first-stage decisions may themselves be discriminatory.
For ease of interpretation, we follow Greiner and Rubin [2011] and motivate our statistical
model by considering settings where there are two deciders (e.g., an officer and a prosecutor) whose
perceptions of race—or gender or other trait—can be independently altered prior to their decisions.
There are, however, examples in which one can plausibly intervene twice even for a single decider
making both decisions. For instance, an officer may decide to stop a motorist based in part on a
brief impression of the motorist’s skin tone as they drive past [Grogger and Ridgeway, 2006, Pierson
et al., 2020]. This visual impression of race could subsequently be altered if the motorist presents a
driver’s license bearing a name characteristic of another race group, or speaks a dialect of English
at odds with the officer’s expectation. However, regardless of whether one imagines there are two
deciders or a single one, our formal statistical results hold unaltered. Similarly, the Knox et al.
statistical framework does not distinguish between these two possibilities.
We now formally describe our model of decision making, beginning with the first stage. We denote
by Di ∈ {w, b} the race of the i-th individual as perceived by the first decider at the first stage, where
for simplicity we consider a population consisting of only white and Black individuals. We focus on
racial discrimination for concreteness, but similar considerations apply to discrimination based on
other attributes, such as gender. Assuming that there is no interference between units [Imbens and
Rubin, 2015], we let the binary variables Mi(w) and Mi(b) denote the potential first-stage decisions
for the i-th individual (e.g., whether they were arrested), and write Mi = Mi(Di) for the observed
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first-stage decision.
Next, we let Zi ∈ {w, b} denote the race of the i-th individual as perceived by the second decider,
at the second stage. In our running example, Zi denotes the race of the i-th individual as perceived
by the prosecutor reviewing that person’s file, while Di denotes race as perceived by the police officer
during the encounter. Finally, we define the second-stage potential outcome as a function of both the
first-stage outcome (e.g., the arrest decision) and the second decider’s perception of race, Zi (e.g.,
race as perceived by the prosecutor). Thus, assuming once again that there is no interference, the
observed second-stage outcome for individual i can be denoted Yi(Zi,Mi(Di)), and we count four
potential outcomes for each individual: Yi(z,m), where z ∈ {w, b} and m ∈ {0, 1}. In our example,
charging decisions are made only for individuals who were arrested, and so Yi(b, 0) = Yi(w, 0) = 0.
We further allow each individual to have an associated vector of (non-race) covariates, Xi,
representing, for example, an individual’s behavior during a police encounter, recorded criminal
history, or both. We imagine these covariates are fixed prior to the second-stage treatment (e.g.,
prior to the prosecutor’s perception of race), since otherwise the key ignorability assumption below
is unlikely to hold. For simplicity of exposition, we assume Xi is discrete. In practice, Xi is only
observed for a subset of the population (e.g., those who were arrested and hence in the dataset), but
we nonetheless define the covariate vector for all individuals in our population of interest. These
covariates are not necessary to define our causal estimands of interest, but they play an important
role in constructing our statistical estimators.
In this model of discrimination, we have taken care to distinguish between the (realized) first-
and second-stage perceptions of race, Di and Zi, as we believe this helps to clarify the timing of
events and the meaning of causal quantities. However, our focus is observational settings, in which
disagreement between Zi and Di may be realized only rarely, if at all. For this reason, we make the
further assumption that Di = Zi, where, for example, the officer’s perception of race is the same as
the prosecutor’s, and we henceforth refer only to Zi. This setting is the one implicitly considered in
Knox et al. Though we restrict our attention to this special case, we note that Proposition 3, one of
our main technical results, applies directly to the more general setting.
With this framing, we now describe the primary causal estimand we consider. This quantity,
which we call the controlled direct effect among the observed (cdeOb)—and which Knox et al. denote
by cdeM=1—reflects discrimination in the second stage of the decision-making process outlined
above, such as discrimination in the prosecutor’s charging decision.
Definition 1 (cdeOb). The controlled direct effect among the observed, denoted cdeOb, is given by:
cdeOb = E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) |M = 1]. (1)
In defining the cdeOb, we imagine that the perception of race is counterfactually determined after
the first-stage decision but before the second-stage decision (e.g., after arrest but before charging,
perhaps by altering the description of race on the incident report viewed by a prosecutor). The
estimand compares outcomes under the two race perception scenarios. Moreover, this estimand
restricts to the subset of individuals who had a “positive” first-stage decision (e.g., those who were in
reality arrested). The cdeOb thus captures discrimination in the second-stage decision among those
who made it past the first stage, such as discrimination in prosecutorial charging decisions among
those who were arrested.
Knox et al. argue that the cdeOb is a contrived estimand, as it involves second-stage counterfactual
outcomes for individuals who may never have made it to the second stage if their race had been
counterfactually altered before the first-stage decision [Knox et al., 2020, Online Appendix, p. 5].
We note, however, that the cdeOb precisely maps to common understandings of disparate treatment
in second-stage decisions, including in our charging example. Further, the causal quantity primarily
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considered by Knox et al.—the te, defined below—requires one to similarly consider counterfactual
outcomes for individuals who might not have made it to the first-stage decision point had they been
a different race. For example, a counterfactually white individual might not have been in the vicinity
of officers, and thus not subject to a first-stage stop or arrest decision. We explore these estimands
in more detail in Section 2.3, and discuss the central role of the cdeOb in discrimination studies.
First, though, we show that a standard ignorability assumption together with an overlap condition
is sufficient to estimate the cdeOb.
2.2 Estimating the cdeOb
Our goal is to estimate the cdeOb using data that only describe those who received a “positive”
decision in the first stage, a decision that itself may have been the product of discrimination. For
example, we seek to estimate discrimination in charging decisions based only on data describing
those who were arrested. Under this statistical setup, Knox et al. claim that the cdeOb cannot be
identified absent a specific set of “highly implausible” ignorability assumptions.4 However, as we
show now, a standard ignorability assumption, together with an overlap condition, is sufficient to
guarantee the cdeOb can be nonparametrically identified by data on the second-stage decisions.
Definition 2 (Subset ignorability). We say that Y (z, 1), Z, M , and X satisfy subset ignorability if
Y (z, 1) ⊥ Z | X,M = 1 (2)
for z ∈ {w, b}.
In our recurring example, subset ignorability means that among arrested individuals, after
conditioning on available covariates, race (as perceived by the prosecutor) is independent of the
potential outcomes for the charging decision. Subset ignorability is thus just a restatement of the
traditional ignorability assumption in causal inference, but where we have explicitly referenced the
first-stage outcomes to accommodate a staged model of decision making. Indeed, almost all causal
analyses implicitly rely on a version of subset ignorability, since researchers rarely make inferences
about their full sample; for instance, it is standard in propensity score matching to subset to the
common support of the treated and untreated units’ propensity scores.
In the traditional, non-staged setting, ignorability is sufficient to guard against omitted-variable
bias and obtain consistent estimates of the average treatment effect. Likewise in a staged model
of discrimination, subset ignorability is sufficient to guarantee consistent estimates of the cdeOb.
Importantly, the first-stage decision, M , and the covariates, X, are pre-treatment relative to the
second-stage intervention. As a result, it may be possible in practice to (approximately) satisfy
subset ignorability and, in particular, to consider estimands for which post-treatment bias is not a
concern.
Proposition 3. Suppose Y (z, 1), Z, M , and X satisfy subset ignorability, and that overlap holds,
meaning that Pr(Z = z | X = x,M = 1) > 0 for all x and z. Then,
cdeOb =
∑
x
E[Y | Z = b,X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1)
−
∑
x
E[Y | Z = w,X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1).
(3)
4Specifically, Knox et al. claim that treatment ignorability, mediator ignorability, and mediator monotonicity, as
defined in Section 5 below, are necessary assumptions.
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Proof. Conditioning on X, we have
cdeOb =
∑
x
E[Y (b, 1) | X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1)
−
∑
x
E[Y (w, 1) | X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1).
(4)
By the subset ignorability assumption in Eq. (2), and our assumption of overlap, we can condition
the summands in Eq. (4) on Z = b and Z = w, respectively, without changing their values, yielding
cdeOb =
∑
x
E[Y (b, 1) | Z = b,X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1)
−
∑
x
E[Y (w, 1) | Z = w,X = x,M = 1] · Pr(X = x |M = 1).
(5)
Finally, the statement of the proposition follows by replacing the potential outcomes with their
realized values.
Proposition 3 immediately implies that when subset ignorability holds—and there is overlap—the
cdeOb is identified by the observed data. Suppose we have n i.i.d. observations (Xi, Zi, Yi)ni=1 with
Mi = 1 (e.g., data on the subset of arrested individuals). Let Szx = {i : Zi = z ∧Xi = x} represent
the set of observations with Z = z and X = x, and let nx denote the total number of observations
with X = x. Then the standard difference-in-means estimator,
∆n =
∑
x
 1
|Sbx|
∑
i∈Sbx
Yi
 · nx
n
−
∑
x
[
1
|Swx|
∑
i∈Swx
Yi
]
· nx
n
, (6)
yields a consistent estimate of the cdeOb. To see this, note that
lim
n→∞
1
|Szx|
∑
i∈Szx
Yi
a.s.
= E[Y | Z = z,X = x,M = 1], and
lim
n→∞
nx
n
a.s.
= Pr(X = x |M = 1).
Consequently, each of the terms in ∆n converges to the corresponding terms in the definition of the
cdeOb, in Eq. (1). Further, a straightforward calculation shows that the following expression yields
a consistent estimate of the standard error of ∆n:
ŝe(∆n) =
√∑
x
(nx
n
)2 [cbx(1− cbx)
|Sbx| +
cwx(1− cwx)
|Swx|
]
(7)
where
cbx =
1
|Sbx|
∑
i∈Sbx
Yi and cwx =
1
|Swx|
∑
i∈Swx
Yi.
Eq. (7) accordingly allows us to form confidence intervals for ∆n.
The stratified difference-in-means estimator is the basis for nearly all applications of benchmark
analysis in discrimination studies. In practice, as we discuss in Section 3, it is common to approximate
∆n via a regression model, but the theoretical underpinnings of that approximation are the same. In
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that sense, our analysis above simply grounds the traditional statistical approach within a specific
causal framework, and demonstrates that the standard ignorability assumption, together with overlap,
is sufficient to yield valid estimates. In Section 5, we directly compare this ignorability condition to
the criteria proposed by Knox et al. However, we note that our results above stand in opposition to
the Knox et al. claim that the “difference in means fails to recover any known causal quantity” in
reasonable settings [p. 1].
2.3 An alternative measure of discrimination
To better understand the cdeOb, we now contrast it with the total effect (te) [Imai et al., 2010a], a
second estimand considered by Knox et al. The total effect and the cdeOb differ in this context
in two ways: (1) the population of individuals about which we are making inferences; and (2) the
timing of the counterfactual comparison. The total effect is not restricted to individuals who had
a “positive” first-stage decision (e.g., those who were arrested). Additionally, in the total effect,
one imagines that perception of race is counterfactually determined before the first-stage decision
(instead of after the first-stage decision, as with the cdeOb), and is the same at both stages.
Definition 4 (te). The total effect, denoted te, is given by:
te = E[Y (b,M(b))− Y (w,M(w))]. (8)
In our recurring example, the total effect captures the effect of race at the time of arrest on the
subsequent charging decision. In particular, if a charged Black individual had instead been perceived
as white, they might never have been arrested, and hence never been at risk of being charged, a
possibility encompassed by the definition of the total effect, but not by the controlled direct effect.
In experimental settings, where researchers actively randomize treatments, the te captures
the total effect of treatment on downstream outcomes. In such experimental settings, the cdeOb
is perhaps an unusual quantity to consider, as it conditions on an intermediate, post-treatment
outcome.5 But in studies of discrimination—particularly racial discrimination—there is no clear
intervention point, and the difference between the te and the cdeOb is largely an artifact of how
one defines both the population of interest and the start of the decision-making process. What is
the te in one description of events may be the cdeOb in another, equally valid description of the
same events, as we explain next.
In our running example, the implicit population of interest consists of those individuals stopped by
the police, and the te reflects a process in which the decision-making process starts—and perception
of race is counterfactually determined—after the stop has occurred but before the arrest decision has
been made. We can, however, imagine moving back the clock and starting the process after an officer
first spots an individual but before a stop decision has been made, with the population of interest
now comprising those individuals spotted by an officer. In this case, the original te is equivalent
to the cdeOb on this newly defined population, where the first-stage decision indicates whether an
individual was stopped. Both the original te and the new cdeOb capture combined discrimination
in the arrest and charging decisions, among the subset of individuals who were stopped. One can
similarly measure cumulative discrimination that includes the stop decision itself, either in terms
5However, even in randomized trials, researchers may be interested in restricting to intermediate outcomes. For
instance, there is a large literature studying the effects of job training programs on wages through random assignment
to program [LaLonde, 1986]. In these settings the outcome of interest (wages) is defined only for units who are
employed—but the employment status of the experimental units is itself affected by the intervention. A popular
framework for studying these problems is principal stratification [Frangakis and Rubin, 2002], which in effect restricts
the estimand to the subset of units who would have had a job regardless of the intervention (sometimes referred to as
the always-employed). This estimand is related to but distinct from the cdeOb.
9
Spotted
Stopped
Arrested
Charged
cdeOb = te
· · · · · ·
tk−1 tk tk+1 tk+2
Figure 1: One can measure combined discrimination in arrest and charging decisions either via the
te or the cdeOb. In studies of discrimination, there is no clear point at which race is “assigned” and
so both the te and the cdeOb can be used interchangeably to express the same underlying causal effect.
The diagram illustrates a multistage process, where one seeks to measure discrimination culminating
at stage tk+2 (e.g., charging decisions) among those who make it to stage tk (e.g., those who were
stopped by the police). This quantity can be viewed as the te, where one imagines the process starting
at time tk. Alternatively, it can be viewed as the cdeOb, where one views the process as starting
earlier (at, say, tk−1, indicating that an officer spotted an individual), and then conditioning on those
who made it to stage tk.
of the te or the cdeOb. For the former, as above, we imagine time starting immediately after a
potential police encounter, with the first-stage decision indicating whether an individual was stopped,
among a population of individuals spotted by the officer. For the latter, we back up the clock once
again and imagine the first-stage indicating whether an individual was spotted by an officer, among
an even larger population of people who perhaps reside in the city under consideration. Figure 1
provides a graphical depiction of this interchangeability.
The above discussion illustrates that the very idea of “intermediate outcomes”—a concept central
to the Knox et al. critique—is a slippery notion in the context of discrimination studies, where
there is no clear point in time where one can imagine that race is “assigned.” Even birth cannot
be considered the ultimate starting point since, in theory, one might include, at the least, the race
of a child’s parents, determined at an earlier stage, when assessing discrimination.6 Indeed, such
generational counterfactuals may be critical for understanding systemic, institutional discrimination.
Although the te appears to avoid conditioning on intermediate outcomes, it simply masks a complex
chain of events that came before the nominal start of the process, a chain that itself was likely
influenced by discriminatory decisions.
6In the case of biological sex, one might consider assignment to occur at conception, though that is typically not
the primary moment of interest in studies of sex discrimination.
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One interpretation of this reality is an even more extreme version of the Knox et al. claim: that
post-treatment bias is fundamentally unavoidable in the study of discrimination. We propose two
alternatives that we believe are more productive. First, one can measure disparate treatment in
the actions of specific deciders at specific decision points. In this vein, the cdeOb aims to narrowly
quantify the effects of protected attributes on specific decisions, net of any discrimination that may
have preceded it. Such assessment is particularly useful for informing legal liability—especially
given constitutional prohibitions against intentional discrimination—and, consequently, for reforming
behavior. For instance, to audit and improve prosecutorial practices, it is useful to understand the
degree to which charging decisions may be motivated by animus or implicit bias [Eberhardt, 2019,
O’Flaherty and Sethi, 2019], even if those decisions are just one part of a complex criminal justice
system. Second, one can measure the broader disparate impacts of decisions on groups defined by
race, gender, or other characteristics, regardless of whether those characteristics themselves affected
the decisions—a point briefly mentioned in the Introduction and to which we return in the Discussion.
Like disparate treatment, disparate impact plays a prominent role in legal and social understandings
of discrimination. This alternative also circumvents many of the statistical challenges with defining
race to be the treatment in a causal analysis, including concerns with post-treatment bias. However,
given our focus on the causal effects of race, we do not discuss disparate impact in detail here, despite
its broader importance.
To deconstruct concerns over post-treatment bias, we concentrate our efforts on elucidating the
statistical properties of the cdeOb. Nonetheless it is worth highlighting some of the conceptual chal-
lenges with framing discrimination in this manner. As alluded to above, many in the causal inference
community have expressed skepticism towards the use of so-called immutable characteristics, such as
gender or race, as valid “causes” because appropriate counterfactuals are hard to define [Holland,
1986, 2003, VanderWeele and Robinson, 2014].7 What does it mean, for example, to imagine an
individual were a different race? The use of perceived traits [Greiner and Rubin, 2011] partially
mitigates the concern, since it is easier to imagine interventions altering perceptions of traits rather
than the traits themselves. Here, though, the exact form of the intervention likely impacts outcomes.
Altering perceptions of race by changing the name on an employment application [Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004] can have different effects than by selectively listing membership in a racial
affinity group [Kang et al., 2016]. As such, any particular operationalization of race (or perception
of race) may only be loosely attached to the underlying theoretical construct. Much has been
written elsewhere on the subtleties of these issues [Jung et al., 2018], and it is not our aim to break
new conceptual ground on the subject. We instead proceed as in Knox et al. and presume the
mathematical objects we study have meaningful interpretations for questions of science and policy.
3 A Stylized Example
Our results above show that subset ignorability, in theory, is sufficient to ensure nonparametrically
identified estimates of the cdeOb, even when the first-stage decisions are discriminatory. We illustrate
that idea by investigating in detail a hypothetical scenario involving arrest decisions in the first
stage and charging decisions in the second stage where subset ignorability holds by construction.
This example includes discrimination in the first-stage decisions and, in particular, violates the
conditions that Knox et al. claim are necessary for identifiability to hold. We then explore the
7VanderWeele and Robinson question the validity of race counterfactuals specifically, though they propose an
alternative framework for interpreting causal effects of race. Relatedly, Sen and Wasow [2016] argue that race, instead
of being “immutable”, is better conceptualized as a “bundle of sticks” that can be disaggregated into elements whose
causal effects can indeed be measured.
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properties of simple estimators in this setting through a simulation study that demonstrates how
one can accurately estimate the true cdeOb using only prosecutorial records.
We consider a hypothetical jurisdiction in which police officers observe the behavior and race of
individuals who are potentially engaged in specific criminal activity (e.g., a drug transaction) and
then decide whether or not to make an arrest. Subsequently, the case files of arrested individuals are
brought to a prosecutor who decides whether or not to press charges. We assume the prosecutor
observes only the documented race and criminal record of the arrestee, and thus, by construction,
the charging decision depends only on these two factors. For example, the prosecutor may choose
only to charge individuals who have several previous drug convictions. Importantly, and in contrast
to the officer, the prosecutor does not observe the individual’s behavior leading up to the arrest.
Our goal is to estimate the cdeOb given the prosecutor’s records on arrested individuals, namely
their criminal history and race. Intuitively, subset ignorability holds in this simple scenario because
the prosecutor’s dataset contains all factors used in the charging decision, even though the prosecutor
does not know all the factors that led to an arrest, a decision that may itself have been discriminatory.
We emphasize that we seek only to estimate discrimination in the second-stage charging decision,
not cumulative discrimination stemming from both the arrest and charging decisions. Further, while
criminal histories themselves may be the product of past discrimination, they reflect a form of
complex, long-term discrimination that we do not aim to measure here. Such alternative notions of
discrimination are important to understand, but here we focus on assessing the prosecutor’s narrow
contribution to inequities at a specific point in time, a common statistical objective closely tied to
policy decisions and legal theories of disparate treatment [Jung et al., 2018].
3.1 The Data-Generating Process
We now formally describe the data-generating process for our stylized example. Under this generative
process, we can both compute the true cdeOb and compute estimates based only on information
available to the prosecutor. Our data generation proceeds in three steps.
Step 1. First, for each person in our (infinite) population of individuals encountered by the police,
we stochastically define their race Zi, criminal history Xi, and behavior Ai. For simplicity, all three
variables are binary—for example, one can imagine that individuals are either white or Black, that
Xi indicates whether an individual had at least one previous drug conviction, and that Ai indicates
whether they were seen actively engaging in a drug transaction. Officers observe Zi and Ai for all
individuals, and prosecutors observe Zi and Xi for the subset of individuals who were arrested. For
appropriately defined constants µZ , µX , µA, δ, and γ, these three covariates are generated as follows:
Zi ∼ Bern(µZ),
Xi ∼ Bern(µX + 1{Zi=b} · δ),
Ai ∼ Bern(µA + 1{Zi=b} · γ).
For ease of exposition, we assume the Bernoulli race variable Zi takes values in {w, b} rather than
{0, 1}. The specification above allows for the distributions of criminal history (X) and behavior (A)
to vary by race (Z).
Step 2. We next define each individual’s potential outcomes for the arrest decision. Let Ui ∼
Unif(0, 1) be a uniform random variable on the unit interval. Then for constants α0, αA, and αblack,
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Table 1: A sample of potential and realized outcomes for individuals in our hypothetical example. The
data-generating process produces the full set of entries, but the prosecutor only observes the realized
outcomes for those who were arrested, indicated by the shaded cells.
Zi Ai Xi Mi(b) Mi(w) Yi(b, 1) Yi(w, 1) Mi Yi
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
b 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
w 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
w 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
set
Mi(b) =
{
1 Ui ≤ α0 + αA ·Ai + αblack
0 otherwise
and
Mi(w) =
{
1 Ui ≤ α0 + αA ·Ai
0 otherwise.
When αblack ≥ 0, anyone who would be arrested if white would also be arrested if Black (i.e.,
Mi(b) ≥ Mi(w)). While not necessary for our results, this monotonicity property ensures our
construction comports with intuitive theories of discrimination; this property is also one of the Knox
et al. assumptions, as we discuss in Section 5. When αblack > 0 (and α0 + αA < 1), we say arrest
decisions are discriminatory since, all else being equal, an individual is more likely to be arrested if
they were Black than if they were white.
Step 3. Finally, we define the charging potential outcomes in an analogous manner to the arrest
potential outcomes. Let Vi ∼ Unif(0, 1) be a uniform random variable on the unit interval. Then
for constants β0, βX , and βblack, set
Yi(b, 1) =
{
1 Vi ≤ β0 + βX ·Xi + βblack
0 otherwise
and
Yi(w, 1) =
{
1 Vi ≤ β0 + βX ·Xi
0 otherwise.
As above, Yi(b, 1) ≥ Yi(w, 1) when βblack ≥ 0, meaning that an individual who would be charged
if arrested and white would also be charged if arrested and Black. This property aids interpretation
but is not necessary for our main results. Also as above, we say the charging decision is discriminatory
when βblack > 0 (and β0 + βX < 1). To complete the definition of the charging potential outcomes,
recall that Yi(b, 0) = 0 and Yi(w, 0) = 0, since we assume one cannot be charged without first being
arrested.
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Features of our Data Generating Process. Table 1 displays a sample of five rows of data
generated from our three-step process. From the full set of potential outcomes, we can compute the
true cdeOb by directly applying Definition 1 to the generated data, taking the average difference
between Yi(b, 1) and Yi(w, 1) among arrested individuals.
Our hypothetical example captures three key features of real-world discrimination studies. First,
prosecutorial records do not contain all information that influenced officers’ first-stage arrest decisions
(i.e., prosecutors do not observe Ai). Second, our set-up allows for situations where the arrest decisions
are themselves discriminatory—those where αblack > 0. As we discuss in more detail in Section 5,
this property violates a condition that Knox et al. assert is necessary to identify the cdeOb. Third,
the prosecutor’s records include the full set of information on which charging decisions are based
(i.e., Zi and Xi). Moreover, the charging potential outcomes (generated in Step 3) depend only on
one’s criminal history, Xi, not on one’s realized race, Zi, and, consequently, Y (z, 1) ⊥ Z | X,M = 1.
Thus by construction, our generative process satisfies subset ignorability.
3.2 Estimating the cdeOb
Although the data-generating procedure produces the full set of potential outcomes for each individual,
the prosecutor only observes a subset of the cells—realized outcomes for arrested individuals,
highlighted in gray in Table 1. We explore the performance of two methods for estimating the cdeOb
based on data observed by the prosecutor: the stratified difference-in-means estimator described in
Eq. (6), and a regression-based estimator.
The prosecutor can implement the stratified difference-in-means estimator in three steps. First,
partition arrested individuals into those with Xi = 0 and Xi = 1. Second, on each resulting subset,
compute the average difference in charging rates between Black and white individuals. Third, take a
weighted average of these differences, where the weights reflect the proportion of arrested individuals
in each subset. In addition, the prosecutor can apply Eq. (7) to estimate the standard error of this
point estimate to generate confidence intervals.
The stratified difference-in-means estimator is theoretically appealing in that it is guaranteed to
yield consistent estimates of the cdeOb, at least when subset ignorability and overlap hold. But the
estimator can have high variance when the dimension of the covariate space is high and the sample
size is small. Thus, in practice, it is common to model potential outcomes as a function of observed
covariates—also known as response surface modeling [Hill, 2011]. In particular, on the subset of
arrested individuals, one can estimate the cdeOb via a parametric model that estimates observed
charging decisions as a function of criminal history and race.
To demonstrate this approach, we use a linear probability model fit on the prosecutor’s data:
E[Yi | Xi, Zi] = β0 + β1Xi + β2Zi. (9)
Under such a linear model, the cdeOb is approximated by β2, since that term captures the difference
in charging potential outcomes after adjusting for the observed covariates. For our specific stylized
example, the linear regression model in Eq. (9) is in fact correctly specified, and so we are guaranteed
to obtain statistically consistent estimates. However, even when the model is not perfectly specified,
this general approach often gives reasonable approximations in practice, especially when one applies
a suitably flexible statistical procedure (e.g., a random forest or regularized regression [Hastie et al.,
2009]) to model observed outcomes.
3.3 Simulation Results
We perform a small simulation study to understand the properties of these two estimators across
various assumptions about levels of discrimination. We simulate 1,000 datasets of size 100,000 for
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each of 25 different parameter settings. Each setting is defined as a combination of our two key
discrimination parameters, αblack and βblack, where each parameter is allowed to take one of five
values: 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, and 0.40. Across all simulation settings, we assume the population
of individuals encountered by police is 30% Black (i.e., µZ = 0.3); that 30% of white individuals
and 40% of Black individuals have a past drug conviction, indicated by Xi; and that 30% of white
individuals and 20% of Black individuals are seen engaging in a drug transaction, indicated by Ai.8
These settings allow for a substantial amount of overlap across race groups with regard to the key
covariates.
On each synthetic dataset, we estimate the cdeOb using both the stratified difference-in-means
estimator and the regression-based estimator, and compare the results to the true population-level
cdeOb. Figure 2 demonstrates that both estimators produce results that are unbiased and that are
typically close to the true estimand across all parameter settings. For each combination of αblack and
βblack, the estimates on the 1,000 synthetic datasets yield the approximate sampling distributions for
the difference-in-means estimator and the regression-based estimator. We summarize each sampling
distribution by its mean, 2.5th percentile, and 97.5th percentile. The solid points correspond to
the difference-in-means estimator, and the hollow points to the regression-based estimator. The
horizontal lines indicate the true population-level cdeOb. In all cases, the points lie on the horizontal
lines, meaning the estimators are unbiased, and the range between the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles
is relatively narrow, indicating estimates are typically close to the true value.
In addition to examining the sampling distributions, we assessed the coverage of our 95%
confidence intervals. For the difference-in-means estimator, confidence intervals were constructed via
the estimated standard error given by Eq. (7); and for the regression-based estimator, we used the
standard OLS estimate of standard error. For each parameter setting, we computed the proportion
of confidence intervals for the 1,000 datasets that contained the true value of the cdeOb. We found
the true coverage was in line with the nominal coverage, ranging from 94% to 96% across parameter
specifications.
4 An Analysis of Real-World Charging Decisions
We now assess possible race and gender discrimination in real-world charging decisions. We start
with the set of individuals in a major U.S. city who were arrested for a felony offense between 2013
and 2019. For our race-based analysis, we then limit to the 25,918 instances in which the race of
the arrested individual was identified as either Black (14,686) or non-Hispanic white (11,232), and
for our gender-based analysis we limit to the 34,871 instances in which the gender of the arrested
individual was recorded as either male (29,283) or female (5,588).9 As in our stylized example in
Section 3, case information is sent to the prosecutor’s office after an officer makes an arrest. In the
jurisdiction we consider, an arrested individual is then charged if the prosecutor handling the case
believes there is sufficient evidence to establish the individual committed the alleged offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that pressing charges would be in line with the city’s justice goals.10
Our dataset includes a variety of information about each case, including the criminal history
8More specifically, the full set of parameters in our simulation was set as follows: µZ = 0.3, µX = 0.3, µA = 0.3,
δ = 0.1, γ = −0.1, α0 = 0.1, αA = 0.3, αblack ∈ {0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4}, β0 = 0.2, βX = 0.4, and βblack ∈
{0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4}.
9Both Hispanic and non-Hispanic white individuals in our dataset appear to have been recorded simply as “white”.
To disentangle these two categories, we followed past work and imputed Hispanic ethnicity from surnames [Pierson
et al., 2020, Word and Perkins, 1996, Word et al., 2008].
10In contrast to these charging criteria, police officers are legally allowed to make arrests when they believe there is
probable cause of criminal activity, a lower evidentiary standard.
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Figure 2: In our hypothetical example of officer and prosecutor behavior, one can obtain accurate
estimates of discrimination in charging decisions based only on information available to prosecutors
on the subset of individuals who were arrested. The plot shows results of 1,000 simulations for each
of 25 different combinations of discrimination in officer and prosecutor decisions, given by αblack
and βblack, respectively. The true value of the cdeOb, indicated by the horizontal colored lines, is
computed based on the full set of potential outcomes for each individual. For each parameter choice,
we summarize the sampling distribution for our two estimators: the stratified difference-in-means
estimator (solid circle) and the regression-based estimator (hollow circle). Specifically, for each
combination of αblack and βblack, we display the mean of the sampling distribution (indicated by the
points), as well as the interval spanned by the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the sampling distribution.
These results show that both estimators can recover the true value of the cdeOb, and also confirm
that the true value of the cdeOb does not depend on the degree of discrimination in the first stage,
as seen by the constant value of the cdeOb across different values of αblack.
of the arrested individual; the alleged offenses (e.g., burglary); the location, date, and time of the
incident; whether there is body-worn camera footage; whether a weapon was involved; whether an
elderly victim was involved; and whether there was gang involvement. We also know the ultimate
charging decision for each case. Disaggregating by gender, 51% of cases involving a male arrestee
were charged, compared to 45% of cases involving a female arrestee; and disaggregating by race, 51%
of cases involving a Black arrestee were charged, slightly higher than the 50% charging rate for cases
involving a white arrestee.
To gauge the extent to which charging decisions may suffer from disparate treatment by race or
gender, we estimate the cdeOb. But before doing so, we first check that overlap is satisfied—meaning
that Pr(Z = z | X = x,M = 1) > 0—for both our race-based and our gender-based analyses. Here,
Zi = 1 indicates an individual’s “treatment” status (i.e., whether an individual is male in our analysis
of gender discrimination, or Black in our analysis of racial discrimination), Xi is a vector of observed
case features, and M = 1 means we restrict to those individuals who were arrested. In contrast to
ignorability, overlap can be assessed directly by examining the data. To do so, we estimate propensity
scores [Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a], Pr(Z = z | X = x,M = 1), via an L1-regularized (lasso)
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Figure 3: We plot, for both our gender-based (left) and race-based (right) analyses, the distribution
of propensity scores, disaggregated by observed treatment status. We find that the propensity scores
are concentrated away from the interval endpoints, satisfying overlap.
logistic regression model.
In Figure 3, we plot the distribution of the estimated propensity scores. In the left panel we
disaggregate by gender, and in the right panel we disaggregate by race (Black and white). In
situations where overlap does not hold, it is common to restrict one’s analysis to a region of the
covariate space where it does hold. In our case, however, the vast majority of the data are already
far from the endpoints of the unit interval, so we work with the dataset in its entirety.
We now estimate the cdeOb via a linear probability model fit to the data, as in our synthetic
examples above:
E[Yi | Xi, Zi] = β0 +Xiβ1 + Ziβ2, (10)
where Yi = 1 if individual i was charged, and Xi denotes the vector of covariates described above.
In the gender model, we find that the ĉdeOb—as given by βˆ2—is 0.025 (95% CI: [0.014, 0.037]); and
in the race model, we have ĉdeOb is −0.008 (95% CI: [−0.018, 0.002]). These results indicate that
the charging rate for men is slightly higher than the rate for similar women, and that the charging
rate for Black individuals is on par with that of similar white individuals, mirroring the patterns we
saw with the raw, unadjusted charging rates. If there are no unmeasured confounders (i.e., if subset
ignorability holds) and our parametric model is appropriate, these results suggest race and gender
have a relatively modest impact on charging decisions in the jurisdiction we consider.
To help contextualize these results, we note that past studies have found mixed evidence of
discrimination in prosecutorial charging decisions, likely due in part to differences in the jurisdictions
and time periods analyzed, and the methods employed. In one of the most comprehensive investiga-
tions to date, Rehavi and Starr [2014] examined nearly 40,000 individuals in the federal criminal
justice system from initial arrest to final sentencing. The authors found that differences in the
initial prosecutorial charging decision between Black and white individuals—specifically for charges
with statutory mandatory minimum sentences—was a primary driver for sentencing disparities.
In contrast, in a recent experimental study, Robertson et al. [2019] found no evidence of racial
bias in charging decisions when they presented prosecutors with vignettes in which the race of the
suspect was randomly varied. Similarly, in an analysis of prosecutors at the San Francisco District
Attorney’s Office, MacDonald and Raphael [2017] found little evidence of discrimination in charging
decisions—in fact, the authors found that white individuals were charged slightly more often than
similarly situated Black individuals.
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The AUC of our outcome model above—fit with all available covariates, including race and
gender—is 86%, indicating that it can predict charging decisions well. Our model, however, cannot
capture all aspects of prosecutorial decision making, as at least some information used by prosecutors
(e.g., forensic evidence) is not recorded in our dataset, meaning that subset ignorability is likely
violated. To check the robustness of our causal estimates to such unmeasured confounding, one may
use a variety of statistical methods for sensitivity analysis [Carnegie et al., 2016, Dorie et al., 2016,
Franks et al., 2019, Imbens, 2003, Jung et al., 2020, McCandless and Gustafson, 2017, McCandless
et al., 2007, Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b]. At a high level, these methods proceed by positing
relationships between the unmeasured confounder and both the treatment variable (e.g., race or
gender) and the outcome (e.g., the charge decision), and then examine the sensitivity of estimates
under the model of confounding.
Here we apply a technique for sensitivity analysis recently introduced by Cinelli and Hazlett [2020].
In brief, their approach bounds the extent to which a coefficient estimate in a linear model—like βˆ2
in Eq. (10)—might change if one were to refit the model including an unmeasured confounder U .
More specifically, under the extended model
E[Yi | Xi, Zi, Ui] = β0 +Xiβ1 + Ziβ2 + Uiγ,
Cinelli and Hazlett bound the change in βˆ2 in terms of two partial R2 values: R2Y∼U |Z,X and R
2
Z∼U |X .
These two values respectively quantify how much residual variance in the outcome Y and treatment
Z is explained by U . Formally, R2Y∼U |Z,X is defined in terms of the R
2 of two linear regressions:
one using all the covariates X, Z, and U to estimate Y (R2full), and one excluding U (R
2
red). Then,
R2Y∼U |Z,X = (R
2
full −R2red)/(1−R2red). R2Z∼U |X is defined analogously. As these partial R2 values
increase, so does the amount by which βˆ2 may change.
The contour plots in Figure 4 show the maximum amount by which the ĉdeOb may change as a
function of R2Y∼U |Z,X and R
2
Z∼U |X for our analysis of gender and race—with that change potentially
increasing or decreasing the estimate. The red lines trace out values for which the maximum change
equals our empirical point estimates of the ĉdeOb. In particular, an unmeasured confounder lying
above the red line could be sufficient to change the sign of our estimate.
A key hurdle in sensitivity analysis is positing a reasonable range for the strength of a possible
unmeasured confounder. The method of Cinelli and Hazlett partially addresses this issue by
parameterizing bounds in terms of partial R2 values, which may be easier to directly interpret than
some alternative methods. To further aid interpretability, we compute the partial R2 values for
various subsets of observed covariates, as recommended by Cinelli and Hazlett. For each such subset,
we fit the regression model in Eq. (10) both with and without that subset, which in turn yields a
pair of partial R2 values for that subset of covariates.
The contour plots in Figure 4 contain these reference points for five different subsets of covariates:
(1) the subset describing criminal history (e.g., number of prior convictions and number of prior
arrests); (2) the alleged offenses (e.g., burglary); (3) the subset of all covariates except for the alleged
offenses; (4) the district in which the alleged incident took place; and (5) whether a weapon was
alleged to have been used. We find that the partial R2 values associated with criminal history and
whether a weapon was used are far below the red curves for both our analysis of gender and race,
indicating that a confounder with comparable marginal explanatory power to these covariates would
not be sufficient to change the sign of our estimates. However, the partial R2 values corresponding
to the alleged offenses and the district in which the charges were filed are near the red curve for our
gender-based analysis and far above the curve for our race-based analysis, meaning that omitting a
covariate with similar explanatory power could qualitatively change our conclusions. Furthermore,
the partial R2 values corresponding to everything except the alleged offenses are far above the
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Figure 4: Contour plots describing the sensitivity of the ĉdeOb to unmeasured confounding, for our
analysis of gender (left) and race (right). The plots indicate the maximum amount the ĉdeOb may
change under the Cinelli and Hazlett [2020] model of confounding, parameterized by two partial R2
values. The red curves correspond to a change equalling the magnitude of the ĉdeOb estimated from
the available data. Thus, an unobserved confounder corresponding to a point above the red curve
would be capable of changing the sign of our estimate. To aid interpretation, both plots display the
partial R2 values associated with several observed subsets of covariates.
red curve in both cases, suggesting that an unobserved confounder of similar strength could again
substantially alter our results.
By definition, it is not possible to know the exact nature and impact of unmeasured confounding.
Thus, as in many applied statistical problems, one must ultimately rely in large part on domain
expertise and intuition to form reasonable conclusions. In this case, based on conversations with
attorneys in our partner jurisdiction, and on our own experience working with criminal justice data,
we interpret these results as providing moderately robust evidence that gender and race likely have
limited effects on prosecutorial charging decisions in this jurisdiction.
5 A Comparison to Alternative Ignorability Conditions
We conclude by stating and investigating the specific mathematical claims of Knox et al. Their main
assertion is that a set of assumptions—which they call treatment ignorability, mediator ignorability,
and mediator monotonicity—are, together, necessary and sufficient conditions for the cdeOb to
be nonparametrically identified by the observed (second-stage) data. As we show below, these
conditions are sufficient but they are not in fact necessary. In particular, the Knox et al. conditions
are unlikely to be satisfied in important examples of potentially discriminatory decision making
where subset ignorability holds (either exactly or approximately) and the cdeOb can accordingly be
estimated, like those situations presented in Sections 3 and 4.
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Aside from the Knox et al. conditions, it is instructive to compare subset ignorability to sequential
ignorability [Imai et al., 2010a,b], a popular and often useful concept that was introduced to formalize
causal mediation analysis, and one that is closely related to the Knox et al. conditions. Sequential
ignorability is strictly stronger than subset ignorability, meaning that the former implies the latter
but that the converse does not hold. In the setting of discrimination studies, there is little reason
to believe sequential ignorability—or reasonable approximations of it—would be satisfied, and we
primarily discuss the idea to clarify its distinction from subset ignorability.
We start by formally considering sequential ignorability, following Imai et al. [2010a,b].
Definition 5 (Sequential ignorability). We say that sequential ignorability is satisfied when the
following two conditional independence criteria hold:
{Y (z,m),M(z′)} ⊥ Z | X, (11)
Y (z,m) ⊥ M | Z,X, (12)
for z, z′ ∈ {w, b} and m ∈ {0, 1}.
The two key conditional independence assumptions we list are the same as in the definition
of sequential ignorability given by Imai et al. [2010a,b], but to facilitate direct comparison with
other ignorability criteria, we omit from our definition the accompanying overlap conditions. Also,
for ease of exposition, we present the definition in the setting of binary treatment and mediator
variables, though the original was more general. In the context of our running example, sequential
ignorability means that: (1) conditional on the observed covariates X, the potential outcomes for
charging Y (z,m) and arrest M(z′) are jointly independent of an individual’s actual race Z; and
(2) conditional on the observed covariates X and an individual’s race Z, the arrest decision M is
independent of the potential charging outcomes Y (z,m).
Theorem 9, below, shows that sequential ignorability implies subset ignorability, but also,
importantly, that sequential ignorability is a strictly stronger condition. To understand why, consider
the stylized model of Section 3.1, in which one has all of the information that drives a prosecutor’s
charging decision—satisfying subset ignorability—but not all of the information that drives an
officer’s arrest decision. For example, X may encode an individual’s criminal history but not that
individual’s behavior at the time of the arrest. In this case, one would in general expect the first
condition of sequential ignorability—in Eq. (11)—to be violated. In particular, without detailed
data on what an officer observes, there is little reason to think the arrest potential outcomes, M(z),
would be independent of an individual’s race, even controlling for factors available to the prosecutor.
We next formally introduce the definitions of treatment ignorability, mediator ignorability, and
mediator monotonicity proposed by Knox et al., starting with treatment ignorability.
Definition 6 (Treatment ignorability). Treatment ignorability is the combination of the following
two conditional independence criteria: for z ∈ {w, b} and m ∈ {0, 1},
M(z) ⊥ Z | X, (13)
Y (z,m) ⊥ Z |M(w),M(b), X. (14)
In the context of arrest and charging decisions, treatment ignorability means that: (1) the
potential outcomes for the arrest decision M(z) are independent of race Z, after conditioning on
the observed covariates X; and (2) the potential outcomes for the charging decision Y (z,m) are
independent of race Z after conditioning on both the covariates X and the arrest potential outcomes
M(w) and M(b).
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The first condition of treatment ignorability is similar to the first condition of sequential
ignorability, and it is unlikely to hold in our setting for the same reason—this condition is indeed
violated in the simple example discussed in Section 3.1, as M(b) depends on A, which in turn
depends on Z. In general, given only information about what motivates the second-stage decision
(e.g., charging, in our case) one cannot say much about what occurs in the first stage (e.g., arrest).
But, critically, such information about the first stage is not necessary to estimate the cdeOb, which
only quantifies discrimination in the second-stage decision. Proposition 3 makes that statement
precise, showing that subset ignorability—which does not consider first-stage potential outcomes—is
sufficient to ensure the cdeOb is nonparametrically identified by the second-stage data.
The second criterion of treatment ignorability appears similar in spirit to subset ignorability,
but it conditions on the potential outcomes M(w) and M(b) rather than on the actual outcome M .
In practice, that distinction may not be too significant; for example, both subset ignorability and
the second condition of treatment ignorability are satisfied in the stylized model of Section 3.1. In
theory, however, the difference between the two is large. As we show in Theorem 9 below, treatment
ignorability alone—even with its strong assumption on the first stage—is not sufficient to ensure the
cdeOb is identified by the second-stage data.
Finally, we consider mediator ignorability and the related mediator monotonicity condition.
Definition 7 (Mediator ignorability). For z ∈ {w, b} and m ∈ {0, 1}, mediator ignorability is
satisfied when
Y (z,m) ⊥ M(w) | Z = z,M(b) = 1, X. (15)
Definition 8 (Mediator monotonicity). Mediator monotonicity is satisfied when
Mi(b) ≥Mi(w). (16)
In our running example, mediator ignorability means that the charging potential outcomes
Y (z,m) are independent of one of the arrest potential outcomes—M(w), the arrest decision for
(counterfactually) white individuals—conditional on the observed covariatesX, and among individuals
of race Z = z, who would be arrested if they were Black. The asymmetry in this condition stems
from the additional mediator monotonicity constraint that Knox et al. argue is also necessary for
valid estimation: Mi(b) ≥Mi(w), meaning that an individual who would be arrested if white would
also be arrested if Black. The monotonicity requirement is perhaps intuitively plausible given our
understanding of racial discrimination, but the conditional independence assumption of mediator
ignorability seems harder to interpret. Nevertheless, Knox et al. write that “every analysis estimating
a racial effect using only data on stopped individuals [i.e., when data are censored except for the
stratum M = 1] implicitly [assumes Mediator Ignorability]” [Knox et al., 2020, p. 8].
Having introduced the key definitions, we can now present our main analytic result, Theorem 9,
which summarizes and formalizes our discussion of the various ignorability assumptions and their
connections to estimating discrimination. In particular, we show that sequential ignorability is a
strictly stronger assumption than subset ignorability, and recapitulate (from Proposition 3) that
subset ignorability is a sufficient condition for the difference-in-means estimator ∆n to yield consistent
estimates of the cdeOb. Further, we show that treatment ignorability is not a necessary condition
for ∆n to yield consistent estimates, in contrast to the Knox et al. claim. We show this by explicitly
constructing examples for which ∆n
a.s.→ cdeOb, but which violate the treatment ignorability condition.
We additionally show that treatment ignorability is not a sufficient condition to guarantee consistency,
despite its formal resemblance to the (sufficient) subset ignorability condition. To do so, we construct
a family of observationally equivalent examples that satisfy treatment ignorability but which have
different values of the cdeOb. Accordingly, no estimator, including ∆n, can yield a consistent
estimate of the cdeOb for every instance in the family.
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Theorem 9. Assume overlap holds, meaning that Pr(Z = z | X = x,M = 1) > 0 for all x and z.
Then we have the following collection of implications and non-implications:
Sequential
Ignorability
Subset
Ignorability
∆n is a consistent
estimator of the cdeOb
Treatment
Ignorability
Treatment Ignorability,
Mediator Ignorability, and
Mediator Monotonicity
Theorem 9, which we prove in Appendix A, refutes the key technical claim of Knox et al. Namely,
we show that the conditions they assert are required for valid inference—treatment ignorability,
mediator ignorabilty, and mediator monotonicity—are not in fact necessary. Importantly, the more
conventional assumption of subset ignorability is sufficient to ensure the cdeOb can be identified
from data on the second-stage decisions. The conclusions in Knox et al. stem from mistaking a
proof of sufficiency for one of necessity. Using treatment ignorability and mediator monotonicity,
the authors first show that cdeOb−E[∆n] = α+ β for certain complex expressions α and β. They
then show that α = 0 and β = 0 if mediator ignorability holds. This argument shows that treatment
ignorability, mediator monotonicity, and mediator ignorability are jointly sufficient to ensure ∆n
provides an unbiased estimate of the cdeOb, but it does not show that these three conditions are
also necessary.
6 Discussion
In response to recent statistical concerns raised about discrimination studies, we have worked to
clarify the theoretical underpinnings of such research. We specifically showed that subset ignorability,
together with overlap, is sufficient to guarantee that a standard causal measure of discrimination (the
cdeOb) is nonparametrically identified in many common settings. In particular, we demonstrated
that a traditional regression-based analysis can be used to assess discrimination in real-world
prosecutorial charging decisions, even though the underlying arrests may have been discriminatory
in unknown ways. In that example—as in many applied settings—subset ignorability may only hold
approximately, and our empirical analysis illustrates the importance of sensitivity analysis for robust
inference. Our conclusions stand in contrast to those of Knox et al., whose critique of discrimination
studies rests on an erroneous mathematical claim. In carrying out this work, we have aimed to make
explicit the often unstated assumptions in studies of discrimination, and to put that research on
more solid theoretical footing.
Stepping back, there are at least two general frameworks for conceptualizing discrimination, which
approximately map to the legal notions of disparate treatment and disparate impact. Both involve
causal interpretations, though with key differences in the definition of the estimand. Disparate
treatment concerns the causal effect of race on outcomes, with behavior often driven by animus or
explicit racial categorization. Disparate impact, on the other hand, concerns the causal effect of
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policies or practices on unjustified racial disparities, regardless of intent. Both disparate treatment
and disparate impact play important roles in legal and policy discussions. But it is critical to
distinguish between the two, as the perspective one adopts in any given situation affects the choice
of statistical estimation strategy and the interpretation of results.
Throughout this paper, we have focused on the statistical foundations and measurement of
disparate treatment. In our primary example—prosecutorial charging decisions—we found the effect
of race and gender on decisions was relatively small. But that finding, in and of itself, does not
mean charging decisions are equitable in a broader sense. Consider, for example, the 1,637 cases
in our data involving alleged possession of controlled substances by Black or non-Hispanic white
individuals. Of these, 748 cases (46%) were ultimately charged, and charging rates by race were
nearly identical across race groups, suggesting little disparate treatment. However, among the 748
charged cases, 464 (62%) involved a Black individual. Charging decisions for these cases thus impose
a heavy burden on Black individuals, even if those decisions were not tainted by animus or implicit
bias. To the extent that prosecution of such drug crimes is misaligned with community goals, these
decisions create an unjustified, and discriminatory, disparate impact.
In observational studies of discrimination, concerns about post-treatment bias may be misplaced,
but rigorously measuring discrimination is still a daunting task. At an empirical level, it is often
difficult to gain access to detailed data on individual decisions, in which case benchmark analysis—
even when coupled with sensitivity analysis—may be an inadequate approach. At a theoretical level,
we still have a limited statistical language to make precise concepts such as animus and implicit
bias that are central to discrimination research. Further, as we note above, much of the literature
has framed discrimination in terms of causal effects of race on behavior, but other conceptions of
discrimination, such as disparate impact, are equally important for assessing and reforming practices.
Finally, the conclusions of discrimination studies are generally limited to specific decisions that
happen within a long chain of potentially discriminatory actions. Quantifying discrimination at any
one point (e.g., charging decisions) does not reflect specific or cumulative discrimination at other
stages—for example, arrests. Looking forward, we hope our work offers a path toward quantifying
disparities, and provokes further interest in the subtle conceptual and methodological issues at the
heart of discrimination studies.
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A Proof of Theorem 9
Proposition 3 shows that subset ignorability implies that ∆n is a consistent estimator of the cdeOb.
We show the remaining seven implications and non-implications in turn, starting with the claim that
sequential ignorability implies subset ignorability. For completeness, we prove that the conjunction
of treatment ignorability, mediator ignorability, and mediator monotonicity implies that ∆n is a
consistent estimator of the cdeOb—a fact initially stated and proved by Knox et al.
Case 1 (Sequential ignorability implies subset ignorability). The first condition of sequential
ignorability, in Eq. (11), states that Y (z,m) and M(z′) are jointly independent of Z given X:
{Y (z,m),M(z′)} ⊥ Z | X. From this, it immediately follows that Y (z,m) alone is independent of
Z given X: Y (z,m) ⊥ Z | X. Now, because Y (z,m) ⊥ M | Z,X—which is the second condition
of sequential ignorability, in Eq. (12)—we have that Y (z,m) ⊥ {Z,M} | X, by the contraction
property of conditional independence. Therefore, by the weak-union property,
Y (z,m) ⊥ Z |M,X. (17)
Subset ignorability now follows, as it is the special case in which M = 1 in Eq. (17).
Case 2 (Subset ignorability does not imply sequential ignorability). Sequential ignorability is an
intuitively stronger condition than subset ignorability, as the former requires that Z is independent
of the mediator potential outcomes M(z) given X. Indeed, the synthetic example given in Section 3
satisfies subset ignorability but violates sequential ignorability.
To formally establish our claim, we construct an even simpler example that satisfies subset
ignorability but not sequential ignorability. First, suppose that Y (z, 1) = 1 and Y (z, 0) = 0,
deterministically for z ∈ {b, w}. In particular, using the language of our policing and prosecution
application, everyone who is arrested is charged, regardless of race. We further set X = 1, which
effectively means that there are no contextual variables. Finally, we set
Pr(Z = z,M(b) = mb,M(w) = mw)
= Pr(Z = z) · Pr(M(b) = mb | Z = z) · Pr(M(w) = mw | Z = z), (18)
where Pr(Z = z) = 12 , Pr(M(z) = 1 | Z = w) = 12 , and Pr(M(z) = 1 | Z = b) = 1. Note that
M = M(Z) and Y = Y (Z,M), and so the above description fully defines the joint distribution on
all the relevant variables.
Now, because Y (z, 1) = 1, we trivially have that Y (z, 1) ⊥ Z | M , meaning that subset
ignorability is satisfied. But, because M(z) 6⊥ Z, sequential ignorability is violated.
Case 3 (Consistency of ∆n does not imply subset ignorability holds). At a high level, even if the
potential outcomes Y (z, 1) are not independant of Z—violating subset ignorability—∆n can still be
a consistent estimator when there is appropriate cancellation. For a concrete illustration of this in
the context of our two-stage arrest and charging application, consider a simple example in which:
(1) there are no contextual variables (i.e., X = 1); (2) the population is evenly split across race
groups (i.e., Pr(Z = z) = 12); (3) everyone in the population is arrested (i.e., M = 1); and (4) the
prosecutor’s potential decisions depend on an arrestee’s actual race. Specifically, we set Y (z, 0) = 0
and Y (z, 1) to be a Bernoulli random variable distributed as follows:
Pr(Y (z, 1) = 1 | Z) =

1 z = b ∧ Z = b,
0 z = w ∧ Z = b,
1
2 Z = w.
(19)
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Because Y = Y (Z,M), the above relationships completely specify the joint distribution of Y , Z, M ,
and X.
Subset ignorability is violated in this example since, by Eq. (19), Y (z, 1) 6⊥ Z. (Because X and
M are constant, we need not condition on them when considering the subset ignorability criterion.)
We further have,
cdeOb = E[Y (b, 1) |M = 1]− E[Y (w, 1) |M = 1]
= (E[Y (b, 1) | Z = b]− E[Y (w, 1) | Z = b]) · Pr(Z = b)
+ (E[Y (b, 1) | Z = w]− E[Y (w, 1) | Z = w]) · Pr(Z = w)
= (1− 0) · 1
2
+
(
1
2
− 1
2
)
· 1
2
=
1
2
.
Finally,
lim
n→∞∆n
a.s.
= E[Y | Z = b,M = 1]− E[Y | Z = w,M = 1]
= 1− 1
2
= cdeOb .
Thus, even though subset ignorability is violated in this example, ∆n yields a consistent estimate of
the cdeOb.
Case 4 (Consistency of ∆n does not imply treatment ignorability holds). Consider the example
described in Case 2. As discussed there, subset ignorability is satisfied in that example and so, by
Proposition 3, ∆n is a consistent estimator of the cdeOb. However, that example does not satisfy
treatment ignorability, as M(z) 6⊥ Z, contrary to Eq. (13). (Because X is constant, we need not
condition on it when evaluating the treatment ignorability criterion.)
Case 5 (Consistency of ∆n does not imply that treatment ignorability, mediator ignorability, and
mediator monotonicity hold). This is directly implied by Case 4.
Case 6 (Treatment ignorability does not imply ∆n is a consistent estimator of the cdeOb). We
show, more generally, that the cdeOb is not identifiable under treatment ignorability alone. To do
so, we construct a family of observationally equivalent examples that satisfy treatment ignorability
but which have different values of cdeOb. As a result, no estimator—including ∆n—can consistently
estimate the cdeOb for every example in this family.
We construct the family of examples as follows. First, as in the other cases, we set X = 1, so that
there are effectively no contextual variables, and we set Y (z, 0) = 0, meaning that if an individual
were not arrested, that individual could not be charged. Second, we set M(b) = 1, meaning that
everyone in the population would be arrested if they were Black. Finally, we set
Pr(Y (z, 1) = yzm,M(w) = mw, Z = z)
= Pr(Y (z, 1) = yzm |M(w) = mw) · Pr(M(w) = mw) · Pr(Z = z), (20)
where Pr(Z = z) = 12 , Pr(M(w) = mw) =
1
2 , and, for α ∈ [0, 1],
Pr(Y (z, 1) = 1 |M(w)) =
{
α M(w) = 0 ∧ z = w,
1 otherwise.
(21)
28
The examples we construct thus differ only in the choice of α.
Now, regardless of α, these examples all satisfy treatment ignorability. To see this, note that
M(w) ⊥ Z by Eq. (20) and M(b) ⊥ Z since M(b) is constant. Consequently, the first condition
of treatment ignorability is satisfied. Eq. (20) further implies that Y (z, 1) ⊥ Z |M(w) and, since
Y (z, 0) is constant, Y (z, 0) ⊥ Z |M(w), establishing the second condition of treatment ignorability.
(Because M(b) and X are constant, we need not condition on them when considering the two
treatment ignorability conditions.)
We next show that all these examples are observationally equivalent. Intuitively, observational
equivalence stems from the fact that the only difference between the examples is in the distribution
of Y (w, 1) for those individuals with M(w) = 0. But for those with M(w) = 0, who would not be
arrested if they were white, we never observe Y (w, 1).
Now, to rigorously establish observational equivalence, we must show that Pr(X = x, Y = y, Z =
z | M = 1) does not depend on the value of α. Because X is constant, we need only consider
Pr(Y = y, Z = z |M = 1). First, observe that
Pr(M = 1) = Pr(M(w) = 1, Z = w) + Pr(M(b) = 1, Z = b)
= Pr(M(w) = 1) · Pr(Z = w) + Pr(Z = b)
= 34 .
Further, note that
Pr(Y = y, Z = z,M = 1) = Pr(Y (z, 1) = y, Z = z,M(z) = 1),
and consider the case z = b. Then, because Y (b, 1) = 1 and M(b) = 1,
Pr(Y = y, Z = b,M = 1) =
{
0 y = 0,
1
2 y = 1.
(22)
Now consider the case z = w. By Eq. (20),
Pr(Y (w, 1) = y, Z = w,M(w) = 1)
= Pr(Y (w, 1) = y |M(w) = 1) · Pr(M(w) = 1) · Pr(Z = w)
= Pr(Y (w, 1) = y |M(w) = 1) · 14 .
By Eq. (21), Pr(Y (w, 1) = 1 |M(w) = 1) = 1, and so,
Pr(Y = y, Z = w,M = 1) =
{
0 y = 0,
1
4 y = 1.
(23)
Finally, combining Eqs. (22) and (23) with the fact that Pr(M = 1) = 34 , we have
Pr(Y = y, Z = z |M = 1) =

0 y = 0,
2
3 y = 1 ∧ z = b,
1
3 y = 1 ∧ z = w.
In particular, Pr(Y = y, Z = z | M = 1) does not depend on α, and so the examples are all
observationally equivalent.
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We conclude the proof by showing that the cdeOb differs across these examples. Specifically, we
have
cdeOb = E[Y (b, 1) |M = 1]− E[Y (w, 1) |M = 1]
= (E[Y (b, 1) |M(w) = 1,M = 1]− E[Y (w, 1) |M(w) = 1,M = 1]) · Pr(M(w) = 1)
+ (E[Y (b, 1) |M(w) = 0,M = 1]− E[Y (w, 1) |M(w) = 0,M = 1]) · Pr(M(w) = 0)
=
1− 1
2
+
1− E[Y (w, 1) |M(w) = 0, Z = b]
2
=
1− α
2
,
where second to last equality follows from Eq. (21) and the fact that the event {M(w) = 0∧M = 1}
equals {M(w) = 0 ∧ Z = b}; the final equality also follows from Eq. (21), as well as the fact that
Y (z, 1) ⊥ Z |M(w). We have thus constructed a family of observationally equivalent examples that
satisfy treatment ignorability but which have different cdeOb, implying that the cdeOb is not in
general identifiable under treatment ignorability alone.
Case 7 (Treatment, mediator ignorability, and mediator monotonicity jointly imply ∆n is a consistent
estimator of the cdeOb). The proof is in two pieces. First, we derive an expression for the cdeOb
holding X constant, and then prove the general claim.
Supposing X = x is constant, recall that by definition Mi = 1 if and only if Mi(z) = 1 where
Zi = z. By mediator monotonicity, M(b) ≥M(w). Therefore, the event {M = 1} can be partitioned
into the following two events:
• E1 = {M(b) = 1 ∧M(w) = 1},
• E2 = {Z = b ∧M(b) = 1 ∧M(w) = 0}.
Recall the definition of the cdeOb in Eq. (1). It follows from the law of total expectation that:
cdeOb = E[Y (b, 1)− Y (z, 1) |M = 1]
= E[Y (b, 1)− Y (z, 1) | E1] · Pr(E1 |M = 1)
+ E[Y (b, 1)− Y (z, 1) | E2] · Pr(E2 |M = 1)
(24)
Now, we examine each of these summands in turn. First, consider the E1 term:
E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) | E1] = E[Y (b, 1) | E1]− E[Y (w, 1) | E1]
By the definition of E1 = {M(b) = 1 ∧M(w) = 1} and the second treatment ignorability condition,
Eq. (14), we are free to condition both terms on the right hand side by levels of Z, yielding
E[Y (b, 1) | Z = b, E1]− E[Y (w, 1) | Z = w,E1] = E[Y | Z = b, E1]− E[Y | Z = w,E1], (25)
where equality follows from replacing potential outcomes by their realized values according to the
definition of Y = Y (M,Z).
Next, consider the E2 term. Again,
E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) | E2] = E[Y (b, 1) | E2]− E[Y (w, 1) | E2].
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It follows from mediator ignorability, Eq. (15), and the definition of E2 that
E[Y (w, 1) | E2] = E[Y (w, 1) | Z = b,M(b) = 1,M(w) = 0]
= E[Y (w, 1) | Z = b,M(b) = 1,M(w) = 1]
= E[Y (w, 1) | Z = w,M(b) = 1,M(w) = 1],
where the last equality follows from treatment ignorability, Eq. (14). Replacing potential outcomes
with their realizations, it follows that
E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) | E2] = E[Y | Z = b, E2]− E[Y | Z = w,E1]. (26)
Now, we substitute Eqs. (25) and (26) into Eq. (24).
cdeOb = (E[Y | Z = b, E1]− E[Y | Z = w,E1]) · Pr(E1 |M = 1)
+ (E[Y | Z = b, E2]− E[Y | Z = w,E1]) · Pr(E2 |M = 1)
= (E[Y | Z = b, E1]− E[Y | Z = w,M = 1]) · Pr(E1 |M = 1)
+ (E[Y | Z = b, E2]− E[Y | Z = w,M = 1]) · Pr(E2 |M = 1)
=
(
E[Y | Z = b, E1] · Pr(E1 |M = 1) + E[Y | Z = b, E2] · Pr(E2 |M = 1)
)
− (E[Y | Z = w,M = 1] · (Pr(E1 |M = 1) + Pr(E2 |M = 1)) )
= E[Y | Z = b,M = 1]− E[Y | Z = w,M = 1], (27)
where the second equality follows from the fact that {M = 1∧Z = w} = {E1 ∧Z = w} by mediator
monotonicity, and the last equality follows from the facts that {M = 1∧Z = b∧E1} = {Z = b∧E1},
{M = 1 ∧ Z = b ∧ E2} = {Z = b ∧ E2}, and Pr(E1 |M = 1) + Pr(E2 |M = 1) = 1.
Now, suppose that X is not constant. Conditioning Y , Z, and M on X = x, it follows from the
law of total expectation that
E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) |M = 1] =
∑
x
E[Y (b, 1)− Y (w, 1) |M = 1, X = x] · Pr(X = x |M = 1)
=
∑
x
E[Y | Z = b,M = 1, X = x] · Pr(X = x |M = 1)
− E[Y | Z = w,M = 1, X = x] · Pr(X = x |M = 1),
(28)
where the second equality follows from Eq. (27), using the fact that X is constant on each of the
events {X = x}. Eq. (28) is identical to Eq. (3) in Proposition 3, and so the estimator ∆n converges
almost surely to the quantity on the right-hand side of Eq. (28) by precisely the same argument as
there.
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